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DANGEROUS CRIMINALS, THE SEARCH FOR
THE TRUTH AND EFFECTIVE LAW
ENFORCEMENT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT




The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Hudson v.
Michigan' and Herring v. United States2 have been viewed as
calling into question the continued use of the exclusionary
rule as a means of deterring illegal searches and seizures by
the police.' Specifically, the Court's focus on what it believes
to be the rule's marginal deterrent effect coupled with the
perceived extremely high social costs associated with the
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Acting Director Criminal Defense
Clinic, Syracuse University College of Law
1. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
2. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 685 (2009).
3. See generally George M. Dery, III, Good Enough for Government Work:
The Court's Dangerous Decision, in Herring v. United States, to Limit the
Exclusionary Rule to Only the Most Culpable Police Behavior, 20 GEO. MASON
U. C.R. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2009) (arguing that the Court diminished everyone's rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures by diluting Fourth Amendment
protections); Matthew Allan Josephson, To Exclude or Not Exclude: The Future
of the Exclusionary Rule after Herring v. United States, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV.
175 (2009) (arguing that the reasoning of the Herring opinion appears to
authorize lower courts to apply the good-faith exception to all police conduct);
Wayne R. Lafave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court's
Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757,
760-61 (2009); David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other
Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2005-2006 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 283 (arguing that Hudson v. Michigan is the beginning of the end
of the exclusionary rule); Mark A. Summers, The Constable Blunders but isn't
Punished: Does Hudson v. Michigan's Abolition of the Exclusionary Rule Extend
Beyond Knock-and-Announce Violations?, 10 BARRY L. REV. 25, 38-39 (2008)
(discussing potential curtailment of the exclusionary rule).
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rule's application, as well as the availability of other remedies
to deter police misconduct, suggests that the Court may be on
the verge of abandoning the exclusionary rule as a remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations. In these decisions the Court
claims that it has always been reluctant to employ the
exclusionary rule due to the costs it imposes on society,5
namely the obfuscation of truth, the thwarting of law
enforcement objectives and the freeing of dangerous
criminals.6 The Court's reasoning in this area not only
overestimates the social costs associated with the use of the
exclusionary rule, but the Justices decisions reflect a
fundamental misunderstanding of how our current criminal
justice system functions. First, the Court's erroneous
assumption that every person charged with a crime is a
"dangerous criminal" inevitably leads to the conclusion that
the use of the exclusionary rule puts ordinary citizens in
danger. Second, the naive description of a criminal trial as a
search for truth ignores the reality that criminal trials are
designed to limit the ability of the state to punish individuals;
they are simply not a forum for truth-seeking. And third, the
idea that the threat of excluding evidence significantly harms
4. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. However, the idea that the exclusionary rule imposes social costs, and
that these costs should be balanced against the rule's deterrent effect, was first
developed by the Berger court in the 1970s. See Sharon L. Davies & Anna B.
Scanlon, Katz in the Age of Hudson v. Michigan: Some Thoughts on
"Suppression as a Last Resort", 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1050 (2008).
6. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 ("Suppression of evidence, however, has always
been our last resort, not our first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates
substantial social costs which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the
dangerous at large. We have therefore been cautious against expanding it and
have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking and
law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its]
application." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). See also
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700-01 ("To the extent that application of the
exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that possible
benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial social costs. The principle cost
of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous
defendants go free-something that offends basic concepts of the criminal
justice system. The rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement
objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application." (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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the ability of the police to fight crime ignores the unlikelihood
that any individual officer will ever be called upon to justify
his or her actions in court. The high number of criminal cases
that are resolved through plea bargaining makes the threat of
suppression incredibly remote.' And in most cases,
particularly when the police suspect a person may possess
drugs or a weapon, the possibility that evidence might be
suppressed in court will in no way alter an officer's behavior.
In this article I will discuss the development of the idea
that the exclusionary rule imposes unacceptably high social
costs, focusing specifically on the fear that the rule leads to
the guilty being set free, that it erodes confidence in our
judicial system, and that it imposes a costly toll on the search
for truth and on the objectives of law enforcement. I will
begin by briefly examining the Court's initial view of the
rule's purpose and then proceed to look more closely at the
genesis of the idea that the rule imposes unacceptably high
social costs. Finally, I will explore the underlying
assumptions that the Court makes in order to come to the
conclusion that the rule imposes these social costs and
demonstrate why these assumptions are false.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Court's Early Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence
Notably absent from the Supreme Court's decision first
adopting the exclusionary rule for evidence unlawfully seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is any mention of the
social costs that might be imposed by the rule.' The Court
based its decision to adopt the exclusionary rule on the
explicit limitations the Fourth Amendment imposed upon the
federal government. The Court made it clear that the Fourth
Amendment placed "limitations and restraints" on the
7. See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony
Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2006, 10 (2010) ("Guilty pleas accounted
for 95% of . . . convictions"); U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006 Statistical Tables, Table 4.1
(2009) (94% of felony offenders sentenced in 2006 pleaded guilty).
8. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (government agents, acting
without a warrant, broke open the door to the defendant's home and seized a
variety of evidence that was later used to convict defendant of mail fraud).
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exercise of federal power and that the purpose of the
Amendment was "to forever secure the people, their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches
and seizures under the guise of law." Excluding evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment thus becomes
necessary because to allow such evidence against a defendant
would render the protection of the Fourth Amendment "of no
value," and absent a rule that would exclude such illegally
obtained evidence, the Fourth Amendment "might as well be
stricken from the Constitution."'o Thus the exclusionary rule
becomes the necessary and inevitable corollary of the rights
secured by the Fourth Amendment. The failure to implement
the exclusionary rule would, to put it simply, "reduce [] the
Fourth Amendment to a form of words."n
The only social costs identified by the Court following the
adoption of the exclusionary rule are those associated with
unchecked executive power. The Court was of the opinion
that the police had a tendency to "obtain conviction by means
of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often
obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted
practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal
Constitution."12 The idea that the judicial branch of
government would condone such overreaching by those
charged with enforcing the law was seen as intolerable. 3
During this period, the Court went so far as to
characterize the guaranties of the Fourth Amendment as "the
very essence of constitutional liberty," stating further that
these rights were "fundamental" and on equal footing with
"the right to trial by jury, to the writ of habeas corpus, and to
due process of law." 4 The Court focused on the defense of
these rights, and not on whatever negative effects the
enforcement of these rights through the exclusionary rule
might have on public safety. In fact, the fear was not that
9. Id. at 391-92.
10. Id. at 393.
11. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
12. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
13. Id. at 394 ("To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such
unauthorized action.").
14. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
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"dangerous criminals" might be set free but rather that the
actions of "well-intentioned, but mistakenly overzealous,
executive officers," would erode the rights guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.' The fact that the application of the
exclusionary rule might afford a "criminal" the opportunity to
commit other crimes was not a relevant factor that the Court
considered because the "greatest dangers to liberty" were
posed by law enforcement, "by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding."" The initial concern of the Court
was not that an individual lawbreaker would escape
punishment but that constitutional violations by law
enforcement would go unchecked.
While subsequent decisions by the Court dealt with
issues ranging from what constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment," to the permissible scope of a search
incident to a lawful arrest,'" the need for the application of
the exclusionary rule when a Fourth Amendment violation
has occurred was never in doubt. Contrary to the Court's
recent concern over the toll taken on our justice system by the
application of the exclusionary rule, previously the rule was
seen as necessary "in order to maintain respect for law; in
order to promote confidence in the administration of justice;
15. Id. See also Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) ("In
their understandable zeal to ferret out crime and in the excitement of the
capture of a suspected person, officers are less likely to possess the detachment
and neutrality with which the constitutional rights of the suspect must be
viewed. To provide the necessary security against unreasonable intrusions
upon the private lives of individuals, the framers of the Fourth Amendment
required adherence to judicial processes wherever possible. And subsequent
history has confirmed the wisdom of that requirement."); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) ("Indeed, the informed and deliberate
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches
and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the
hurried action of officers and others who may happen to make arrests. Security
against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search
warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while
acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of
crime." (citing Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931); United
States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926))).
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
17. See generally id. (majority opinion) (considering whether a wiretap
constitutes a "search" as defined by the Fourth Amendment).
18. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1947) (discussing the
reasonableness of the extent of a warrantless search incident to an arrest in the
defendant's home).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
[and] in order to preserve the judicial process from
contamination."'9 In the words of Justice Brandeis from his
dissent in Olmstead v. United States:
The door of a court is not barred because the plaintiff
has committed a crime. The confirmed criminal is as
much entitled to redress as his most virtuous fellow
citizen; no record of crime, however long, makes one an
outlaw. The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks
it has violated the law in connection with the very
transaction as to which he seeks legal redress.
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that
government officials shall be subjected to the same rules
of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that the government
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its
face.20
The Court also displayed a willingness to apply the
exclusionary rule when law enforcement violated specific
provisions of a federal statute. Namely, the Court adopted
the general principle that the sovereign is embraced by the
general words of a statute intended to prevent injury and
harm.21 Thus, whether the conduct by law enforcement
constituted a violation of a constitutional amendment or a
federal statute, the police would not be permitted to profit
19. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 484-85.
21. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937) (holding the
prohibition of wiretapping contained in the Communications Act of 1943
applicable to federal law enforcement, and suppressing evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal wiretap). See also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
341-42 (1943) (holding that the failure of federal officers to bring the
defendants before a magistrate judge immediately following their arrest, as
required by statute, resulted in the exclusion of incriminating statements made
during a lengthy period of custodial interrogation).
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from their illegal conduct.
B. The Supreme Court's Shifting Construct of the "Dangerous
Criminal"
More recently, in Herring v. United States, the Court did
not require the suppression of drugs and a firearm that
officers found in a search incident to an arrest based on a
subsequently recalled warrant.22 In Hudson v. Michigan,
police officers executed a search warrant for narcotics and
weapons but admittedly violated the "knock-and-announce"
rule and the defendant was subsequently convicted of drug
possession charges.2 3 The Court held that the exclusionary
rule was an inappropriate remedy for a "knock-and-
announce" violation.24
It could be argued that the Court's initial willingness to
apply the exclusionary rule was influenced by the type of
evidence subject to exclusion as well as the underlying
offense. In the period immediately following the Court's
decision in Weeks v. United States, the vast majority of the
cases where the exclusionary rule was applied dealt primarily
with the possession of alcohol or gambling instrumentalities
and with various forms of tax evasion.2 5 The Court's two most
recent decisions wherein it declined to apply the exclusionary
rule dealt with the possession of illegal drugs and weapons.2 6
22. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 698 (2009).
23. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
24. Id. at 603-04.
25. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (operating a distillery in
violation of the Internal Revenue Code); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948) (possession of opium); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
(conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy Act); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927) (possession with fraudulent intent of counterfeit strip stamps used in the
bottling of bonded whiskey); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (sale of
unregistered and untaxed cocaine); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)
(possession and sale of untaxed whiskey); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (involving a statute forbidding the use of the mail to distribute lottery
tickets). See also Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (conspiracy to
import, transport, distribute or sell liquor in violation of the National
Prohibition Act); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (same); Go-
Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (same); Gambino v.
United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (same).
26. In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. at 588, the defendant was found to be
in possession of "large quantities" of drugs, including "cocaine rocks" in his
pocket as well as a loaded gun, while in Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. at
698, the defendant was a convicted felon who was found to be in possession of
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Perhaps Booker Hudson and Bennie Dean Herring were seen
as "dangerous criminals" by the Court whose release into
society would have imposed too great a cost. Yet the fact that
a defendant may be a "dangerous criminal," however one
chooses to define that term, was simply not part of the Court's
analysis when the exclusionary rule was adopted. In fact, on
a number of occasions the Court dealt squarely with the
notion that the application of the rule would allow "dangerous
criminals" to go free and nevertheless excluded relevant
evidence."
For most of its history, the exclusionary rule has been
viewed by the Court as necessary for the preservation of those
methamphetamine and a pistol.
27. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. at 142 (Murphy, J., dissenting),
Justice Murphy emphasized that the defendant's culpability had no impact on
the decision to apply the exclusionary rule:
The circumstance that petitioners were obviously guilty of gross
fraud is immaterial. The Amendment provides no exception in its
guaranty of protection. Its great purpose was to protect the citizen
against oppressive tactics. Its benefits are illusory indeed if they are
denied to persons who may have been convicted with evidence gathered
by the very means which the Amendment forbids. Its protecting arm
extends to all alike, worthy and unworthy, without distinction. Rights
intended to protect all must be extended to all, lest they so fall into
desuetude in the course of denying them to the worst of men as to
afford no aid to the best of men in time of need.
The benefits that accrue from this and other articles of the Bill of
Rights are characteristic of democratic rule. They are among the
amenities that distinguish a free society from one in which the rights
and comforts of the individual are wholly subordinated to the interests
of the state. We cherish and uphold them as necessary and salutary
checks on the authority of government. They provide a standard of
official conduct which the courts must enforce. At a time when the
nation is called upon to give freely of life and treasure to defend and
preserve the institutions of democracy and freedom, we should not
permit any of the essentials of freedom to lose vitality through legal
interpretations that are restrictive and inadequate for the period in
which we live.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The following year, in McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943), the failure of federal officers to bring the defendants before
a magistrate judge immediately following their arrest resulted in the exclusion
of incriminating statements made while defendants were in the officers'
custody. The Court did not feel the need to try and justify the imposition of the
exclusionary rule; there was no mention of what social costs might be imposed
through its application. See generally id. This omission of the social costs
analysis occurred despite the fact that McNabb involved a murder of a federal
officer during a raid on a family of suspected bootleggers where illegal alcohol
was recovered and where one of the defendants confessed to firing a shot at the
officers. Id.
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rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. While the
Court's recent decisions in Hudson and Herring would lead
one to believe that the Court has always feared applying the
exclusionary rule because doing so leads to the release of
dangerous criminals into society, that concern was first
articulated by the Court seventy years after the exclusionary
rule was adopted in Weeks.2 8 For most of its history, the truly
"dangerous criminal" was not the bootlegger, the bookie, or
the drug dealer, but was instead the government agent who
exceeded his or her authority. A private individual who
breaks the law is simply not as dangerous as the government
agent who ignores the legal prohibitions contained in the
Fourth Amendment. The former breaks a single law, while
the latter imperils our liberty.
C. The Post-Leon Conception of the Exclusionary Rule as
"Punishment"
Beginning in 1984 with the Court's decision in United
States v. Leon, the Court repudiated the notion that the
exclusionary rule was a "necessary corollary of the Fourth
amendment"29 and stated that the "substantial social costs
exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth
Amendment rights ha[d] long been a source of concern."30 As
the Court points out in Leon, a number of exceptions to the
application of the exclusionary rule for a violation of the
Fourth Amendment had already been carved out in previous
decisions." And beginning in 1976 with the Court's decision
28. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984); Herring, 129 S.
Ct. at 701 ("The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty
and possible dangerous criminals go free-something that 'offends basic
concepts of the criminal justice system.'" (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 908)); see also
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595 (referencing "the grave adverse consequence that
exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence always entails (viz., the risk of
releasing dangerous criminals into society)" as the type of "substantial social
cost" previously identified by the Court in Leon).
29. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
30. Id. at 907.
31. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus review of
state convictions); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury
proceedings); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (holding that co-
conspirators and co-defendants whose rights were not violated by illegal
eavesdropping have no standing to object to the admission of evidence obtained
as a fruit of such eavesdropping); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963) (attenuation doctrine); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)
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in Stone v. Powell, the Court stated that one of the problems
with the exclusionary rule is that "the focus of the trial, and
the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from
the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the
central concern in a criminal proceeding."3 2 This idea, namely
that the implementation of the exclusionary rule interferes
with the truth-finding function of judge and jury in a criminal
case, was reiterated in several decisions" prior to the Court's
statement in Leon that "this interference with the criminal
justice system's truth-finding function" is an "objectionable
collateral consequence" of the exclusionary rule.34 The fact
that the exclusionary rule precludes the consideration of
reliable, probative evidence is viewed by the current Court as
problematic." These substantial social costs-the freeing of
dangerous criminals, the erosion of confidence in our system
of justice, and the thwarting of law enforcement objectives-
can only be justified if imposing the rule results in deterrence
of illegal police conduct, and if deterring illegal police conduct
and protecting individuals is valued as highly as deterring
crime. 1
The exclusionary rule is no longer wielded by the Court
as a weapon to combat what it previously identified as the
(impeachment of a defendant).
32. Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-90.
33. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) ("Each time the
exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication
of fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the
trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected."); see also United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
268, 278 (1978).
34. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
35. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) ("Because
the exclusionary rule precludes consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it
imposes significant costs: It undeniably detracts from the truth-finding process
and allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the
consequences of their actions.").
36. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594-95 (2009) ("Quite apart from the
requirement of unattenuated causation, the exclusionary rule has never been
applied except where its deterrent benefits outweigh its substantial social
costs." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009) ("We have repeatedly
rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth
Amendment violation. Instead we have focused on the efficacy of the rule in
deterring Fourth amendment violations in the future. In addition, the benefits
of deterrence must outweigh the costs." (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added)).
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natural tendency of law enforcement to violate the Fourth
Amendment in an effort to combat crime. Rather, it is viewed
as a kind of punishment," which not only discourages well-
intentioned law enforcement but also frees dangerous
criminals. In a sense, the Court's pronouncement in Leon
that the social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule "have
long been a source of concern"" is correct, although it would
seem that the perception of what exactly those social costs are
has changed considerably.
III. DANGEROUS CRIMINALS
A. The Court's Overbroad Definition of "Dangerous
Criminals"
Let us examine the Court's fairly recent concern that the
exclusionary rule imposes substantial social costs because it
allows dangerous criminals to escape punishment." The fact
that the Court fears letting guilty and potentially dangerous
defendants go free displays a view of a defendant in a
criminal case that is so simplistic that it borders on
ignorance. The Court does not view a defendant as a person
who may, or may not, have committed a specific crime, but
rather as a potentially dangerous "criminal," a phrase which
brings to mind murderers, rapists and robbers. Instead of
viewing a defendant as a person who is alleged to have
broken a specific law on a specific date at a specific time, the
Court's choice of language clearly implies that it views a
"criminal" as someone who is engaged in an ongoing effort to
break the law. When we consider the emphasis given in
Hudson and Herring to the idea that the person freed might
be "dangerous," then we can see even more clearly the Court's
assumption that anyone who is a defendant in a criminal case
is, at the very least, potentially a dangerous criminal.
37. See generally Brooks Holland, The Exclusionary Rule as Punishment, 36
RUTGERS L. REC. 38 (2009) (exploring the consequences of a punishment-based
theory of the exclusionary rule).
38. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
39. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701 ("The principal cost of applying the rule is, of
course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free . . . ."); Hudson,
547 U.S. at 591 ("The exclusionary rule generates substantial social costs, which
sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large." (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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However, statistics indicate that over 50% of defendants
charged with a felony have never been previously convicted of
a felony and that approximately 40% have no prior
convictions.40 Only 4% of arrests nationwide are for violent
crimes and only 12% are for property crimes. 4 ' Arrests for
possessory offenses, such as the possession of guns or drugs,
which are the type of cases where we would expect the
exclusionary rule to have the greatest impact, do not exceed
15% of arrests nationwide.4 2 It is worth noting that in both
40. In 2000, in the seventy-five largest counties in the United States, 42% of
felony defendants had no prior convictions; an additional 18% had never
previously been convicted of a felony. Table 5.53: Prior Felony Convictions of
Felony Defendants in the 75 Largest Counties, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t553.pdf
(last visited Nov. 6, 2010). In 2002, 41% of felony defendants had no prior
convictions; an additional 16% had never been convicted of a felony.
Table 5.53.2002: Prior Felony Convictions of Felony Defendants in
the 75 Largest Counties, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5532002.pdf (last visited
Nov. 6, 2010). In 2004, 38% of felony defendants had no prior convictions;
an additional 16% had never been convicted of a felony. Table 5.53.2004:
Prior Convictions of Felony Defendants in the 75 Largest Counties,
THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t5532004.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
See also Patrick A. Langan, Ph.D. & David J. Levin, Ph.D., Recidivism
of Prisoners Released in 1994, NCJ, June 2002, available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (indicating that while 67.5% of
prisoners released in 1994 from state prisons in fifteen states were rearrested
within three years, only 47% were actually convicted of a new offense and only
25.4% were returned to prison with a new sentence).
41. In 2008, 4% of arrests nationwide were for murder, non-negligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault ("violent
crimes"); 12% of arrests were for burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and
arson ("property crimes"). See Table 4.1.2008: Estimated Number of
Arrests, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t4l2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
In 2007, 4% of arrests nationwide were for violent crimes; 11% of arrests
were for property crimes. See Table 4.1.2007: Estimated Number of
Arrests, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t412008.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
In 2006, 4% of arrests nationwide were for violent crimes; 11% of arrests
were for property crimes. See Table 4.1.2007: Estimated Number of
Arrests, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t412008.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
42. In 2008 the percentage of arrests for carrying or possessing weapons
was 1% and for drug abuse violations was 12%. See Table 4.1.2008: Estimated
Number of Arrests, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE, http//www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t4l2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,
2010). In 2007, the percentage of arrests for carrying or possessing weapons
was 1% and for drug abuse violations was 13%. See Table 4.1.2007: Estimated
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Hudson and Herring,4 3 the defendants were charged with the
possession of drugs and a weapon, so perhaps characterizing
them as "dangerous" might be warranted. But the
characterization of the defendants in Weeks, who were
convicted of a type of mail fraud," and the defendant in Mapp
v. Ohio, who was found to be in possession of "obscene"
materials," as "dangerous defendants" is hardly credible. In
essence, invoking the "dangerous defendant" justification is
simply a scare tactic to inflate the supposed social costs of the
exclusionary rule. Viewed another way, the Court's emphasis
on the possibility that the exclusion of evidence will free
dangerous defendants is a very subtle way of saying that the
law should not apply to everyone; it is choosing to apply the
penal law to defendants over applying the Constitution to law
enforcement officers.46
1. The Vanishing Presumption of Innocence
Perhaps even more disturbing is the way in which the
Court's reasoning undermines the presumption of innocence.
Admittedly, the Court is reviewing cases where a defendant
has been convicted of a crime and thus the veil of innocence
which cloaked the defendant during his or her trial has been
stripped away. Nevertheless, when the Court is calculating
whether or not to apply the exclusionary rule in a given
situation, it is important to remember that the application of
Number of Arrests, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t412007.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,
2010). In 2006 the percentage of arrests for carrying or possessing weapons was
1% and for drug abuse violations was 13%. See Table 4.1.2006: Estimated
Number of Arrests, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t412006.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,
2010).
43. Booker T. Hudson was arrested following the execution of a search
warrant for narcotics and weapons and was subsequently convicted of drug
possession. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006). Bennie Dean
Herring was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and
knowingly possessing methamphetamine. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
695, 698 (2009).
44. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
45. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) ("We must
therefore look upon the exclusion of evidence in federal prosecutions if obtained
in violation of the Amendment as a means of extending protection against the
central government's agencies. So a search against Brinegar's car must be
regarded as a search of the car of Everyman.") (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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the rule will take place before a trial commences. The fear
that a dangerous criminal might escape punishment is then
used by the Court to justify not applying the exclusionary
rule at a point in time when a defendant is still presumed to
be innocent.
To be certain, there are instances where the supposed
"dangerous defendant" would be freed by the imposition of the
exclusionary rule; but there are also countless defendants
whose release would hardly be a scourge on society. Take, for
instance, the case of a teenage college student who has never
been arrested, who is stopped by the police for failing to come
to a complete stop at a stop sign and then searched illegally.
The police recover a small bag of marijuana. Under the
current method of analysis, the court would presume that the
application of the exclusionary rule would entail substantial
social costs. I find it hard to imagine what "substantial"
social costs would be imposed if a court granted suppression
in this particular case. In addition, I hardly suspect that
anyone would argue that suppression of the marijuana
recovered in this case would result in the release of a
"dangerous criminal."
Or take the case of an Iraqi War veteran who possesses
an unregistered handgun, which under an applicable state
law, is a crime. Suppose the police come to his house because
his neighbors complain about the noise from a party. The
police then proceed to enter his home without his consent and
conduct an illegal search which results in the recovery of the
aforementioned unregistered handgun. What "substantial"
social costs are imposed by the suppression of this evidence?
Why would the court automatically conclude that this
defendant is a "dangerous criminal"?
What about a defendant who had already been convicted
of several drug possession charges, who is again charged with
drug possession but was searched illegally? Assume that the
quantity of drugs in this defendant's possession is entirely
consistent with personal use and there is no other evidence
suggesting that the defendant was attempting to sell drugs.
As the case against this defendant progresses, the defendant
enters a drug rehabilitation program. Eventually a
suppression hearing is held and the court applies the
exclusionary rule and the case against the defendant is
dismissed. At the time the court grants suppression, the
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defendant happens to have been clean for six months. Once
again, I fail to see the "substantial" societal costs imposed in
this case and I find it hard to imagine that anyone would
characterize such a defendant as a "dangerous criminal."
If we remove the assumption that every defendant who
gains the benefit of the exclusionary rule is potentially
"dangerous," and if we view a defendant as simply someone
charged with a crime rather than a "criminal," then the
conclusion that the application of the rule entails substantial
societal costs becomes suspect. Undoubtedly, there will be
times when the application of the rule will free a defendant
who can fairly be described as a dangerous criminal, someone
who is engaged in and has every intention of continuing to
engage in illegal activity that poses a serious threat to others.
Gang members who are engaged in narcotics trafficking come
to mind. However, this fact isn't an unintended social cost of
the rule as the Court has been arguing; it is simply the price
we pay to maintain the rule of law.47
2. The Court's Misconceptions Regarding "Dangerous
Criminals" Have Been Fueled By Incorrectly
Assuming a High Rate of Criminal Recidivism.
An additional assumption inherent in the fear that
dangerous criminals will be unleashed on society by the
application of the exclusionary rule is that those who escape
punishment will be emboldened. If this is to be believed, we
must assume that the defendant who is facing a lengthy
prison sentence who escapes punishment due to the exclusion
of evidence concludes that he or she is immune from
prosecution. Using this logic, we would likewise conclude
that police officers who stop individuals for speeding and then
only give them a verbal warning, as opposed to a ticket, are
simply encouraging the individual to disregard the posted
speed limit.
We might also consider the fact that many defendants
who eventually reap the benefit of the suppression of evidence
47. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1392-93 (1983); see also United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 980 (1984) (Stevens, J. dissenting); id. at 929-30 (Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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have been in custody for a significant period of time prior to
having their Fourth Amendment rights vindicated.48 While
Justice Scalia may feel that the exclusionary rule amounts to
a "get out of jail free card,"" a defendant who is charged with
a felony may spend a significant amount of time in pre-trial
detention before he or she has the opportunity to have a
hearing on the legality of a search that led to incriminating
evidence.
To be sure, there are some defendants who, having
avoided punishment, will engage in other criminal activity.
But under the Court's current analytical method, the
assumption is that every defendant who avoids punishment
as a result of the suppression of evidence will re-offend." It is
just as logical to assume that a defendant who narrowly
avoids a lengthy prison sentence due to the suppression of
evidence will view any future criminal activity as too risky.
While the application of the exclusionary rule may enable a
48. In 2000 and 2002, in the seventy-five largest counties in the United
States, 38% of felony defendants were detained until the disposition of their
case. Table 5.54: Felony Defendants Released Before or Detained Until Case
Disposition in the 75 Largest Counties, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS (2003), http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t554.pdf (last
visited Nov. 6, 2010); Table 5.54.2002: Felony Defendants Released Before
or Detained Until Case Disposition in the 75 Largest Counties,
THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5542002.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
In 2004, in seventy-five largest counties in the United States, 43% of felony
defendants were detained until the disposition of their case. Table 5.54.2004:
Felony Defendants Released Before or Detained Until Case Disposition in the 75
Largest Counties, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http:// www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5542004.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
In addition, the median time between arrest and sentencing for felons convicted
in state Courts in 2000 was 153 days with 86% sentenced within one year.
Table 5.50: Time Between Arrest and Sentencing for Felons Convicted in State
Courts, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2003),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t550.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
The median time between arrest and sentencing for felons convicted in state
Courts in 2002 was 184 days with 78% sentenced within one year. Table
5.50.2002: Time Between Arrest and Sentencing for Felons Convicted in State
Courts, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5502002.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
49. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006).
50. See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism
of Prisoners Released in 1994, 7 (2002) (noting that within three years from
their release, 67.5% of prisoners were rearrested for a new offense while 46.9%
were convicted of a new crime with 25.4% back in prison as a result of another
prison sentence).
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defendant to avoid a more serious punishment, it is not
logical to conclude that the rule interferes with rehabilitation,
another purported goal of our criminal justice system.
B. The Mischaracterization of Trials as a "Search for Truth"
has Wrongfully Narrowed the Exclusionary Rule's Scope
The exclusionary rule's "costly toll upon truth-seeking" is
also cited by the Court in Hudson and Herring as one of the
substantial social costs that the application of the rule
entails." In 1927, shortly after adopting the exclusionary
rule, the Court expressed concern that a criminal prosecution
should amount to more than a "game" where evidence proving
the defendant's guilt should be ignored because the police
exceeded their authority.52 Nevertheless, for many years the
Court steadfastly applied the rule regardless of how reliable
or probative the evidence might have been in a given case."
The underlying understanding of the rule's function was to
encourage compliance with the Fourth Amendment by the
only means available, namely the exclusion of evidence."
There was recognition that the restrictions placed on the
government by the Fourth Amendment would, by design,
hamper law enforcement to a certain degree." The goal of the
51. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (quoting Pa. Bd.
of Prob. & Parole, 524 U.S. at 364 (1998)); Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (quoting Pa.
Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998)).
52. See McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927) ("A criminal
prosecution is more than a game in which the Government may be checkmated
and the game lost merely because its officers have not played according to
rule.").
53. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Berger, J., dissenting) ("For more than 55 years this
Court has enforced a rule under which evidence of undoubted reliability and
probative value has been suppressed and excluded from criminal cases
whenever it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment." (citing Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914))).
54. "Beyond doubt, a main objective of the rule 'is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it.'" Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). See
also Stewart, supra note 47.
55. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
If nothing else, the Amendment plainly operates to disable the
government from gathering information and securing evidence in
certain ways. In practical terms, of course, this restriction of official
power means that some incriminating evidence will inevitably go
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exclusionary rule was simply to compel law enforcement to
obey the Fourth Amendment; the fact that its application
would diminish, to some degree, the reliability of a verdict in
a criminal case was viewed as irrelevant."
In Alderman v. United States, the Court declined to
extend the exclusionary rule to defendants who lacked
standing to contest an illegal search.5 ' The Court was "not
convinced that the additional benefits of extending the
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those
accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on
the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth."" This
concern for discovering the truth counseled against extending
the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings in United
States v. Calandra," especially when the historically broad
investigatory power of the grand jury is taken into
consideration. Undoubtedly, society has an interest in
discovering the truth and the exclusion of reliable evidence
does come at a cost. But beginning with the Court's decision
in Stone v. Powell,"o the Court begins to characterize the
exclusion of evidence in a criminal case as a kind of
distraction that ignores the ultimate question in a criminal
trial, that of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.6 ' The
Court goes on to suggest that the indiscriminate application
of the rule may actually generate "disrespect for the law and
administration of justice."6 2 It is worth noting that the Court
fails to cite any prior decisions to support this assertion. For
undetected if the government obeys these constitutional restraints. It
is the loss of that evidence that is the "price" our society pays for
enjoying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the Fourth
Amendment.
Id.
56. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 238 (1969) ("The purpose of
the exclusionary rule, unlike most provisions of the Bill of Rights, does not
include, even to the slightest degree, the goal of insuring that the guilt-
determining process be reliable.") (Black, J., dissenting).
57. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 187 (1969).
58. Id. at 174-75.
59. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
60. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
61. Id. at 489-90 ("The costs of applying the exclusionary rule . .. are well
known: the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are
diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the
central concern in a criminal proceeding.").
62. Id. at 490-91.
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the first time, the Court suggested that the application of the
exclusionary rule, a rule that from its origins was designed to
"compel respect"3 for the Fourth Amendment, may actually
generate "disrespect for the law." But even more significant
is the Court's characterization of a criminal trial as one where
the "ultimate question" is the "guilt or innocence" of the
defendant.'
The assertion that the ultimate question in a criminal
trial is the "guilt or innocence" of the defendant is simply a
misstatement of basic criminal procedure. No defendant in
the United States may be found innocent by a jury of his or
her peers. The only options given to the trier of fact are
"guilty" or "not guilty." The Court's assertion that the
application of the rule takes a toll on the search for truth,
which began in Stone v. Powell," and has continued
unchallenged for nearly thirty-five years,66 is only relevant if
a criminal trial is, in fact, a search for truth. It is astonishing
that this assertion has gone unchallenged for so long.
Simply put, criminal trials are not a search for the truth.
If they were, then the jury would be called upon to make
findings of fact, or at the very least, they would have the
option of declaring that a defendant was "guilty," "not guilty"
or "innocent." It is important to remember that a jury in a
criminal trial is only being asked to decide whether or not the
prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt,
thus they can only find a defendant "guilty" or "not guilty." It
is one thing to recognize that there is a "public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted
63. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
64. Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-90.
65. Id. at 489-91.
66. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) ("[Tlhe rule's
costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high
obstacle for those urging [its] application," (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1998))). The Court goes on in Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole to say, "[a]lthough we have held these costs to be worth
bearing in certain circumstances, our cases have repeatedly emphasized that
the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives
presents a high obstacle for those urging application of the rule." 524 U.S. at
364-65 (citing Payner v. United States, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)). Further, the
Court pointed out in Payner v. United States that "cases have consistently
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce
ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding
functions of judge and jury." 447 U.S. at 734.
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or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the
truth,"6 ' and that there is a "strong interest under any system
of justice of making available to the trier of fact all concededly
relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks
to adduce."" But the claim that the "ultimate question" in a
criminal trial is the "guilt or innocence" of the defendant and
that a criminal trial is a "search for truth" is something very
different. By falsely claiming that the truth is being deflected
by the exclusionary rule, the Court is able to inflate the costs
of the exclusionary rule.
If a criminal trial is a way of limiting the state's
authority to punish suspected law breakers then the
exclusion of evidence obtained by the government in violation
of the Constitution seems entirely reasonable. But if one
characterizes the criminal trial as a search for the truth, then
the rule is no longer one of many that limit the state's
authority. Instead, it works to undermine the supposed goal
of our criminal justice system: the discovery of the truth. To
be blunt, the truth doesn't always matter in a criminal case;
the search for truth is often held in check by the
Constitution." Undoubtedly, compelling a defendant to
testify at a criminal trial would assist the trier of fact in
determining the truth, but the Fifth Amendment forbids it."
Evidence is regularly kept from the jury so as not to prejudice
them when they attempt to decide the very narrow issue of
whether or not the prosecution has proven their case beyond
a reasonable doubt. For example, a defendant's prior
criminal convictions may or may not be admissible, depending
on the circumstances of the case, and a complainant's prior
67. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
68. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974).
69. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975) ("We are, after all,
always engaged in a search for truth in a criminal case so long as the search is
surrounded with the safeguards provided by our Constitution.").
70. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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sexual history in a rape case may or may not be admissible
due to "rape shield" laws. The court regularly balances the
relevancy of certain types of evidence for fear that certain
evidence, even if it is reliable or probative, might unduly
prejudice the jury.
The other question that arises when we consider the
Court's assertion that the application of the exclusionary rule
impedes the "truth-finding functions of judge and jury"' is
what "truth" are we more concerned about: the truth that a
defendant may have been in possession of incriminating
evidence or the truth that government agents violated the
Constitution in an effort to recover that evidence? This
question is perhaps best answered after considering the
standing requirements first articulated by the Court in Jones
v. United States." If a defendant is required to assert a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched by the
police, then in cases where the defendant is alleged to have
been in possession of some type of contraband, the defendant
will essentially be admitting to possession of the illegal item
to assert his or her Fourth Amendment rights. If that is the
case, how does the application of the exclusionary rule deflect
the truth? The truth is that a defendant was in possession of
contraband and has admitted such in requesting a hearing on
the legality of the police conduct. The application of the
exclusionary rule doesn't prevent society from knowing the
truth; it prevents the government from punishing someone
who possessed contraband. In Herring, it was undoubtedly
true that Bennie Dean Herring was in possession of drugs
and a gun. And it was equally true that the warrant the
officer relied upon to make the arrest was no longer valid. If
the Court were to have deemed that evidence inadmissible
due to a Fourth Amendment violation, would the fact that the
defendant was in possession of drugs and a gun be any less
true?
In United States v. Payner, when declining to apply the
exclusionary rule, the Court noted that "it is the defendant,
and not the constable, who stands trial."" The Court is
71. Payner, 447 U.S. at 734.
72. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See also Payner, 447 U.S.
at 734; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Alderman, 394 U.S. 165; Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
73. Payner, 447 U.S. at 734.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
clearly referencing Judge Cardozo's famous opinion in People
v. Defore.74 But the oft-quoted adage that the criminal is to go
free because "the constable has blundered" is itself a subtle
mischaracterization of the truth; the truth is that when the
rule is applied, a defendant avoids conviction because the
government broke the law.
C. The Court's Drastic Oversimplification of "Law
Enforcement Objectives"
In both Herring and Hudson the Court references the
exclusionary rule's costly toll on "law enforcement
objectives."" This sentiment is a far cry from the Court's
pronouncement in Mapp v. Ohio that we cannot assume that
"as a practical matter, adoption of the exclusionary rule
fetters law enforcement."" The question then must be asked,
what are the objectives of law enforcement? The objective of
police officers is to apprehend those suspected of crimes while
the objective of the prosecutor is to convict those accused of
crimes. While these two objectives are not mutually
exclusive, they are hardly identical. The Court seems to
assume that the objective of all "law enforcement" is to
punish those who commit crimes through conviction and
incarceration. The previously discussed emphasis placed on
"substantial social costs" attributed to the exclusionary rule,
the greatest of which the Court declares is "letting guilty and
possibly dangerous defendants go free," would seem to
indicate that the sole objective of law enforcement is to
74. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) ("The criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered.").
75. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) ("'[The rule's
costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high
obstacle for those urging [its] application.'" (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1998))); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591
(2006) ("We have therefore been cautio[us] against expanding it and have
repeatedly emphasized that the rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking and law
enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its]
application." (citing Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 524 U.S. at 364-365; Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pa. Bd.
of Prob. & Parole, 524 U.S. at 364-65 ("Although we have held these costs to be
worth bearing in certain circumstances, our cases have repeatedly emphasized
that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives
presents a high obstacle for those urging application of the rule." (citing Payner,
447 U.S. at 734)).
76. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
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punish the guilty. While arguably the ultimate objective of
law enforcement is to see that the guilty are punished, the
suggestion that the application of the exclusionary rule
thwarts "law enforcement objectives" is a drastic
oversimplification used by the Court to suggest that the costs
of applying the rule are unreasonably high.
Let us consider for a moment the "objectives" of the
typical law enforcement officer. The primary objective of a
police officer is to arrest those who violate the law. The
officer may hope to see the arrestee prosecuted, convicted and
then sentenced; but his primary focus is on the arrest. The
Court has previously referenced this fact when considering
the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule." In fact, once the
arrest is made, the likelihood of the defendant entering a plea
of guilty and the improbability of the case ever going to trial
would suggest that law enforcement objectives, if we assume
that objective is a conviction, are hardly impacted at all by
the exclusionary rule." The criminal justice system's current
77. "The case is made, so far as the police are concerned, when they
announce that they have arrested their man. Rejection of the evidence does
nothing to punish the wrong-doing official, while it may, and likely will, release
the wrong-doing defendant." Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
78. The conviction rate for defendant charged with felonies in the seventy-
five largest counties in the United States in 2004 was 68%. Table 5.57.2004:
Adjudication Outcome for Felony Defendants in the 75 Largest Counties,
THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5572004.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
Of those convicted, 98% plead guilty while 2% were convicted following a trial.
Id. While 23% of those charged with felonies had the charges dismissed only 1%
were acquitted after trial. Id.
The conviction rate for defendants charged with felonies in the 75
largest counties in the United States in 2002 was 68%. Table 5.57.2002:
Adjudication Outcome for Felony Defendants in the 75 Largest Counties,
THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5572002.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
Of those convicted, 96% plead guilty while 3% were convicted following a trial.
Id. While 24% of those charged with felonies had the charges dismissed only 1%
were acquitted after trial. Id.
In New York State, 68.9% of adult felony arrests resulted
in conviction in 2008 and only 0.4% of defendants were acquitted
after trial. New York State Department of Criminal Justice Statistics,
Disposition of Adult Arrests (Nov. 16, 2009), available at:
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nys.pdf. For adult drug
felony arrests, the conviction rate was 73.3% and only 0.3% of defendants were
acquitted after trial. Id. The fact that the conviction rate for felony drug
charges is higher than that for felonies in general would suggest that the
exclusionary rule does very little to interfere with law enforcement objectives
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reliance on plea bargaining significantly reduces the chance
that an officer's conduct will ever be scrutinized by a court,
which means that law enforcement objectives would almost
never be impacted by the infrequent application of the
exclusionary rule."
In addition to the unlikelihood that an officer would ever
be required to testify in court regarding an arrest, there are
several other factors which undercut the Court's assumption
that the exclusionary rule frustrates the objectives of law
enforcement. One is the concern that police officers would
have for their safety. In the vast majority of street
encounters and vehicle stops it can be argued that an officer's
immediate concern for his or her safety trumps any remote
fear that evidence might someday be excluded. It is simply
irrational to assume that the fear of the exclusionary rule will
discourage a police officer from searching a person or a
vehicle for a weapon. Ultimately, any rational officer would
choose to err on the side of caution and not on the side of the
Constitution.so
because we would expect the application of the rule to have the greatest impact
on possessory offences such as drug or weapons charges. See id. National
statistics also seem to indicate that there is a greater likelihood of conviction for
drug offenses then for other violent offenses or for types of property crime. See
Table 5.0002.2004: Felony Convictions and Sentences and Rate Per 100
Arrests, THE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t500022004.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,
2010).
In California, 59% of felony defendants entered pleas of guilty
before trial during the 2007-2008 fiscal year while only 2% of
felony arrests were resolved with a trial. See 2009 Court Statistics Report:
Statewide Caseload Trends, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/csr2009.pdf (last visited Nov.
6, 2010). Overall, 61% of felony defendants were convicted of a crime while only
15% were either acquitted or had their cases dismissed. See id.
79. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984), the Court found that
one of the objectionable collateral consequences of the exclusionary rule "is that
some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of
favorable plea bargains." Id. It is somewhat puzzling that the Court finds the
possibility of a "favorable plea bargain" to be such an objectionable collateral
consequence of the exclusionary rule. An objection to the guilty being set free is
one thing, but it is difficult to see how a plea bargain impacts the criminal
justice system's supposed truth-finding function.
80. This sentiment is perhaps best expressed by the unofficial first rule of
law enforcement: "make sure that when your shift is over you go home alive."
THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Pictures 1987).
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Furthermore, the focus upon convicting and
incarceratings' a defendant as the objective of law
enforcement ignores the separate objective of seizing
contraband. Both law enforcement and society in general
have a vested interest in the seizure of dangerous and illegal
items, such as firearms and narcotics. Because the
confiscation of contraband is in itself a societal "good," even if
the evidence were to be subsequently suppressed, there would
be minimal "costs" on society imposed by the exclusionary
rule. While the objective of convicting the defendant who
possessed the contraband might not be achieved, the removal
of the contraband from society is another law enforcement
objective that has been achieved despite the exclusionary
rule. It is worth noting that, unlike in Weeks, where the
defendant was petitioning to have the evidence at issue
returned to him,82 Bonnie Dean Herring was not going to be
handed back a handgun and methamphetamine if the Court
had applied the exclusionary rule in his case. Furthermore,
confidence in our judicial system is not eroded by such an
application." Unlike the situation where someone goes
unpunished for a violent crime perpetrated upon another
citizen, when someone is charged with merely possessing a
prohibited item, the exclusion of evidence obtained by the
police when there has been a violation of a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights serves to reinforce the public's confidence
in the rule of law.
In fact, one can imagine a scenario where law
enforcement intentionally disregarded the prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures in order to
effectuate the seizure of contraband with full knowledge that
81. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) ("Because
the exclusionary rule precludes consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it
imposes significant costs: It undeniably detracts from the truth-finding process
and allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the
consequences of their actions.").
82. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 387 (1914). The defendant in
Weeks filed a petition before trial commenced entitled "Petition to Return
Private Papers, Books and Other Property." Id.
83. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976) ("Thus, although the
rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of
respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well
have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration
of justice.").
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whatever evidence they might recover would be deemed
inadmissible. Consider a neighborhood where the
proliferation of gun violence had reached epidemic
proportions. The police might adopt a tactic of aggressively
searching anyone they stop for a traffic infraction with the
objective of getting as many guns off the street as possible.
The fact that the weapons they recover might be suppressed
and convictions rendered unattainable by the exclusionary
rule becomes irrelevant. The confiscation of the illegal
weapon, the arrest and possible pre-trial detention of the
defendant and the possibility of a conviction for some offense
as part of a plea bargain all further the objectives of law
enforcement.84
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Leon, the Court announced that the
"substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for
the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a
source of concern."8 ' But the Court fails to analyze those
"substantial" costs, other than to reference the impediment to
the "truth-finding" functions of the judge and jury which the
Court had previously identified in United States v. Payner."
The fear the Justices articulate is that "some guilty
defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a
result of favorable plea bargains."" They also are concerned
with the "magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty
defendants" and believe that this is offensive to the "basic
concepts of the criminal justice system."" The overarching
fear seems to be that the application of the rule will generate
disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. That
84. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974), in deciding it
was unnecessary to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, the
Court suggested that "[flor the most part, a prosecutor would be unlikely to
request an indictment where a conviction could not be obtained." I find this
reasoning to be highly suspect when we consider the coercive effects of pre-trial
detention coupled with our current criminal justice system's reliance on plea
bargaining. It would seem entirely logical for a prosecutor to obtain an
indictment against a defendant and then offer a favorable plea bargain which
the defendant may very well accept in order to avoid the risk of incarceration.
85. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984).
86. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980).
87. Leon, 448 U.S. at 907.
88. Id. at 908.
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fear, coupled with the belief that the rule entails "substantial"
social costs, continues to inform the Court's reasoning when it
comes to the application of the exclusionary rule, as evidenced
by the Court's two recent opinions in Hudson v. Michigan"
and Herring v. United States."
However, as I have argued, these fears are overblown
and fail to take into account some of the basic tenants of our
criminal justice system. The idea that most, if not all of the
defendants charged with a crime are dangerous is simply an
exaggeration. Moreover, the suggestion that a criminal trial
is a search for the truth is a mischaracterization of basic
criminal procedure. The statement that the focus of a
criminal trial is, and should always remain, on the guilt or
innocence of a defendant is simply untrue. The conclusion
that imposing the rule will somehow frustrate law
enforcement fails to recognize the proliferation of plea
bargaining and the practical objectives of police officers.
Fundamentally, the Court has changed how it views the
exclusionary rule. Originally, the exclusionary rule was a
way of protecting the people from their own government.9'
Now, the Supreme Court characterizes the rule as not only an
obstacle to effective law enforcement but also as a threat to
the safety of the citizenry. The Court now focuses its
attention on the fact that the guilty may be set free by the
application of the exclusionary rule and tend to ignore the
fact that an officer of the law has broken it. While the
dissenting Justices in Herring may disagree with the majority
regarding the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a
deterrent, they fail to challenge the assumption that the rule
imposes unacceptably high social costs.92 If the Court were to
attempt to articulate "a more majestic conception" of the
Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule,93 it might first
do well to confront the exaggerated claims of the rule's cost to
our society. Ultimately, the Court needs to remember that
89. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
90. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 685 (2009).
91. "Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided
against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic." McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
92. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704-711.
93. Id. at 707 (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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the rule is designed to protect the people from their
government, which has the potential to become the most
dangerous of criminals.
